The aim of this project is to identify if the Schneider electronics system is still the most suitable system to house the SCADA package by comparing our current as-is processes and technology against other market options. We expect this project to liaise with and benchmark potential OEMs/technologies and identify which is the most suitable for the future NGT landscape – NG, Hydrogen and Blending.
This project will explore the regulatory, policies and procedure and the legislative changes that may need to occur when changing over to hydrogen. This is for both the EEMUA 191 standard and the GS(M)R.
This project will explore the options for developing a 3D version of the SCADA system to support the established 2 dimensional versions.
Benefits
To research and identify a SCADA system that will work for all Hydrogen blends.
To understand the possibility of creating uniformity between the SCADA systems in place at the GNCC, SCADA team and all sites on the NTS.
To research and identify the possibility of building not only a 2D SCADA system but also a 3D representation for fault finding, alarm handling and training .
To analyse how to future proof the SCADA system.
Learnings
Outcomes
Due to the challenging conditions in data and information sharing between National Gas and the supplier on the critical national infrastructure SCADA data, the project team decided to close this project early. The supplier performance in this project was excellent and they were very flexible in trying to find a resolution, it was simply the challenging data sharing conditions which were the sole the reason we have decided to cancel this project.
This was a mutual decision made between National Gas and the supplier based on the challenges around data sharing and the delays in approvals that National Gas were experiencing. We have therefore agreed to re-visit the concept of the project with the SCADA team in the short to medium term future. Additionally, we have arranged a lesson learnt session between both parties to document the challenges and ensure they are not repeated in any future work.
Lessons Learnt
Whilst the project was closed early the team captured the lesson learnt between both parties to document the challenges and ensure they are not repeated in any future work as below:
1. Extensive delays in obtaining information required to complete the project. This is due to several root issues:
· Information relating to SCADA systems, at site and UK-wide level, is extremely sensitive. SCADA information is a matter of national security, and NGT handle it with utmost privacy. The sensitivity of this information was perhaps not understood by Innovation colleagues at project kick off.
· The data requested by the project is complex and has no single source for approval. This means there is a lengthy process of approvals, checking and confirmations that should have been completed prior to kick off.
In the future we may wish to:
· Fully understand the data classification, data sharing process and potential security requirements. Ensure there is early engagement with the data owner for an agreement with enough time (and possibly cost) as required when handling data of this sensitivity. If security clearance/NDA is required, this must be in place and completed before KO the project.
· Define in more detail the data that is required before the project is initiated, to allow for better gauging of time and resource required to collect the data. If possible, the data sharing approval and security requirements must be in place before KO to ensure that ways of working are agreed by both parties. If possible, a list of data required should be provided along with quote submission.
2. The project did not include the scope of existing vendor's ability to develop into net-zero capabilities in the future. The mitigation is to implement existing vendor's future plan into the scope of the project.
3. Public and social media communications of both parties on the study of critical national infrastructure projects should be limited and carefully disseminated to the public domain. The team should conduct communications & stakeholder risk assessments, especially on commercialisation perspectives, and anonymise sensitive project information if possible.
4. The supplier did not receive the National Gas highly sensitive data sharing process as part of the scope and time estimates which leads to the project severely delayed. A sensitive information sharing plan should be in place (data sharing process, people security, ways of working, handling the data) and shared with the 3rd party before the project commences.
5. The supplier created the quote with an engineer resource assigned, then a different consultant resource was assigned to carry out the project once the PO was received leading to unfamiliarity of highly sensitive information sharing and process of working with the project team. The mitigation plan is for the supplier to resource the plan with real time resource booking taken into account.
6. More onsite and face to face meetings were required in the project than planned. This needs to be sorted in the quotation phase and ensure there is a change management process in place if there is more travel costs required.
